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Abstract—A new framework for information hiding security,
called chaos-security, has been proposed in a previous study.
It is based on the evaluation of unpredictability of the scheme,
whereas existing notions of security, as stego-security, are more
linked to information leaks. It has been proven that spread-
spectrum techniques, a well-known stego-secure scheme, are
chaos-secure too. In this paper, the links between the two
notions of security is deepened and the usability of chaos-
security is clarified, by presenting a novel data hiding scheme
that is twice stego and chaos-secure. This last scheme has better
scores than spread-spectrum when evaluating qualitative and
quantitative chaos-security properties. Incidentally, this result
shows that the new framework for security tends to improve
the ability to compare data hiding scheme.
Keywords-Information hiding; Spread-spectrum; Chaotic it-
erations; Stego-security; Chaos-security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information hiding has recently become a major digital
technology [7], [10], especially with the increasing impor-
tance and widespread distribution of digital media through
the Internet. Spread-spectrum data-hiding techniques have
been widely studied in recent years under the scope of
security. These techniques encompass several schemes, such
as Improved Spread Spectrum (ISS), Circular Watermark-
ing (CW), and Natural Watermarking (NW). Some of these
schemes have revealed various security issues. On the con-
trary, it has been proven in [5] that the Natural Watermarking
technique is stego-secure. This stego-security is one of the
security classes defined in [5]. In this paper, probabilistic
models are used to categorize the security of data hiding al-
gorithms in the Watermark Only Attack (WOA) framework.
We will show that the security level of such algorithms can
be studied into a novel framework based on unpredictability,
as it is understood in the theory of chaos [6]. To do so, a
new class of security will be introduced, namely the chaos-
security. This new class can be used to study some categories
of attacks that are difficult to investigate in the existing
security approach. It also enriches the variety of qualitative
and quantitative tools that evaluate how strong the security
is, thus reinforcing the confidence that can be had in a given
scheme.
In addition of being stego-secure, it has been proven
in [3] that Natural Watermarking technique is chaos-secure.
Moreover, this technique possesses additional properties
of unpredictability, namely, strong transitivity, topological
mixing, and a constant of sensitivity equal to N2 . However
NW are not expansive, which is problematic in the Constant-
Message Attack (CMA) and Known Message Attack (KMA)
setups [3]. In this paper, it is proven by using the new
chaos-security framework, that a more secure scheme than
NW can be found to withstand attacks in these setups.
This scheme, introduced in [2], is based on the so-called
chaotic iterations. The aim of this work is to prove that
this algorithm is stego-secure and chaos-secure, to study
its qualitative and quantitative properties of unpredictability,
and then to compare it with Natural Watermarking.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion II, basic definitions and terminologies in the field of
chaos and security are recalled. In Section III the stego-
security of chaotic iterations is established in some cases,
whereas in Section IV is studied the chaos-security of
chaotic iterations. Natural Watermarking and chaotic iter-
ations are then compared in Section V. The paper ends
with a conclusion where our contribution is summarized,
and planned future work is discussed.
II. BASIC RECALLS
A. Chaotic iterations
In this section, the definition and main properties of
chaotic iterations are recalled [1].
1) Chaotic iterations: In the sequel Sn denotes the nth
term of a sequence S and Vi the ith component of a
vector V . Finally, the following notation is used: [[1;N ]] =
{1, 2, . . . , N}.
Let us consider a system of a finite number N of elements
(or cells), so that each cell has a boolean state. A sequence
of length N of boolean states of the cells corresponds to a
particular state of the system. A sequence which elements
belong to [[1;N]] is called a strategy. The set of all strategies
is denoted by S.
Definition 1 The set B denoting {0, 1}, let f : BN −→ BN
be a function and S ∈ S be a strategy. The so-called chaotic
iterations are defined by x0 ∈ BN and ∀(n, i) ∈ N∗×[[1;N]]:
xni =
{
xn−1i if Sn 6= i(
f(xn−1)
)
Sn
if Sn = i.
2) Devaney’s chaotic dynamical systems: Consider a met-
ric space (X , d) and a continuous function f on X . f is said
to be topologically transitive if, for any pair of open sets
U, V ⊂ X , there exists k > 0 such that fk(U) ∩ V 6= ∅.
(X , f) is said to be regular if the set of periodic points is
dense in X . f has sensitive dependence on initial conditions
if there exists δ > 0 such that, for any x ∈ X and any
neighborhood V of x, there exists y ∈ V and n > 0 such that
|fn(x) − fn(y)| > δ. δ is called the constant of sensitivity
of f . Quoting Devaney in [6],
Definition 1 A function f : X −→ X is said to be chaotic
on X if (X , f) is regular, topologically transitive and has
sensitive dependence on initial conditions.
3) Chaotic iterations and Devaney’s chaos: In this sec-
tion we give outline proofs of the properties on which our
secure data hiding scheme is based. The complete theoretical
framework is detailed in [1].
Denote by ∆ the discrete boolean metric, ∆(x, y) =
0 ⇔ x = y. Given a function f , define the func-
tion: Ff : [[1;N]] × BN −→ BN such that Ff (k,E) =(
Ej .∆(k, j) + f(E)k.∆(k, j)
)
j∈[[1;N]]
.
Let us consider the phase space X = [[1;N]]N×BN and the
map Gf (S,E) = (σ(S), Ff (i(S), E)), where σ is defined
by σ : (Sn)n∈N ∈ S → (Sn+1)n∈N ∈ S, and i is the map
i : (Sn)n∈N ∈ S → S
0 ∈ [[1;N]]. So the chaotic iterations
can be described by the following iterations:
X0 ∈ X and Xk+1 = Gf (Xk).
We have defined in [1] a new distance d between
two points (S,E), (Sˇ, Eˇ) ∈ X by d((S,E); (Sˇ, Eˇ)) =
de(E, Eˇ) + ds(S, Sˇ), where:
• de(E, Eˇ) =
N∑
k=1
∆(Ek, Eˇk) ∈ [[0;N]]
• ds(S, Sˇ) =
9
N
∞∑
k=1
|Sk − Sˇk|
10k
∈ [0; 1].
It is then proven that,
Proposition 1 Gf is a continuous function on (X , d).
In the metric space (X , d), the vectorial negation f0 :
B
N −→ BN , (b1, · · · , bN) 7−→ (b1, · · · , bN) satisfies the
three conditions for Devaney’s chaos: regularity, transitivity,
and sensitivity [1]. So,
Proposition 2 Gf0 is a chaotic map on (X , d) according
to Devaney.
B. Using chaotic iterations as information hiding schemes
1) Presentation of the scheme: We have proposed in [2]
to use chaotic iterations as an information hiding scheme,
as follows (see Figure 1). Let:
• (K,N) ∈ [0; 1]×N be an embedding key,
• X ∈ BN be the N least significant coefficients (LSCs)
of a given cover media C,
• (Sn)n∈N ∈ [[1,N]]
N be a strategy, which depends on
the message to hide M ∈ [0; 1] and K ,
• f0 : B
N → BN be the vectorial logical negation.
(a) Original Lena. (b) Watermarked Lena.
Figure 1. Data hiding with chaotic iterations
So the watermarked media is C whose LSCs are replaced
by YK = XN , where:{
X0 = X
∀n < N,Xn+1 = Gf0 (X
n) .
In the following section, two ways to generate (Sn)n∈N
are given, namely Chaotic Iterations with Independent Strat-
egy (CIIS) and Chaotic Iterations with Dependent Strat-
egy (CIDS). In CIIS, the strategy is independent from
the cover media X , whereas in CIDS the strategy will
be dependent on X . Their stego-security are studied in
Section III and their chaos-security in Section IV.
2) Examples of strategies:
CIIS strategy: Let us first introduce the Piecewise
Linear Chaotic Map (PLCM, see [8]), defined by:
Definition 2 (PLCM)
F (x, p) =


x/p if x ∈ [0; p]
(x− p)/(12 − p) if x ∈
[
p; 12
]
F (1 − x, p) else.
where p ∈
]
0; 12
[
is a “control parameter”.
Then, we can define the general term of the strategy
(Sn)n in CIIS setup by the following expression: Sn =
bN×Knc+ 1, where:

p ∈
[
0; 12
]
K0 = M ⊗K
Kn+1 = F (Kn, p), ∀n ≤ N0
in which ⊗ denotes the bitwise exclusive or (XOR) between
two floating part numbers (i.e., between their binary digits
representation). Lastly, to be certain to enter into the chaotic
regime of PLCM [8], the strategy can be preferably defined
by: Sn =
⌊
N×Kn+D
⌋
+ 1, where D ∈ N.
CIDS strategy: The same notations as above are used.
We define CIDS strategy as follows: ∀k 6 N ,
• if k 6 N and Xk = 1, then Sk = k,
• else Sk = 1.
In this situation, if N > N, then only two watermarked con-
tents are possible with the scheme proposed in Section II-B,
namely: YK = (0, 0, · · · , 0) and YK = (1, 0, · · · , 0).
III. EVALUATION OF THE STEGO-SECURITY
A. Definition of stego-security
Stego-security, defined in the Simmons’ prisoner prob-
lem [9], is the highest security class in WOA setup [5].
Let K be the set of embedding keys, p(X) the prob-
abilistic model of N0 initial host contents, and p(Y |K1)
the probabilistic model of N0 watermarked contents. We
suppose that each host content has been watermarked with
the same key K1 and the same embedding function e.
Definition 3 The embedding function e is stego-secure if
and only if: ∀K1 ∈ K,p(Y|K1) = p(X)
B. Evaluation of the stego-security
Let us now study the stego-security of the scheme. We
will prove that,
Proposition 3 CIIS are stego-secure.
Proof: Let us suppose that X ∼ U (BN) in a CIIS
setup. We will prove by a mathematical induction that
∀n ∈ N, Xn ∼ U
(
B
N
)
. The base case is immediate,
as X0 = X ∼ U
(
B
N
)
. Let us now suppose that the
statement Xn ∼ U
(
B
N
)
holds for some n. Let e ∈ BN and
Bk = (0, · · · , 0, 1, 0, · · · , 0) ∈ B
N (the digit 1 is in position
k). So P (Xn+1 = e) =∑Nk=1 P (Xn = e+Bk, Sn = k) .
These two events are independent in CIIS setup, thus:
P
(
Xn+1 = e
)
=
∑N
k=1 P (X
n = e +Bk) × P (S
n = k).
According to the inductive hypothesis: P
(
Xn+1 = e
)
=
1
2N
∑N
k=1 P (S
n = k). The set of events {Sn = k} for
k ∈ [[1;N ]] is a partition of the universe of possible, so∑N
k=1 P (S
n = k) = 1.
Finally, P
(
Xn+1 = e
)
= 1
2N
, which leads to Xn+1 ∼
U
(
B
N
)
. This result is true ∀n ∈ N, we thus have proven
that,
∀K ∈ [0; 1], YK = X
N0 ∼ U
(
B
N
)
when X ∼ U
(
B
N
)
So CIIS defined in Section II-B are stego-secure.
We will now prove that,
Proposition 4 CIDS are not stego-secure.
Proof: Due to the definition of CIDS, we have P (YK =
(1, 1, · · · , 1)) = 0. So there is no uniform repartition for the
stego-contents YK .
IV. EVALUATION OF THE CHAOS-SECURITY
A. Definition
To check whether an information hiding scheme S is
chaos-secure or not, S must be written as an iterate process
xn+1 = f(xn) on a metric space (X , d). This formulation
is always possible, as it is proven in [3]. So,
Definition 4 An information hiding scheme S is said to be
chaotic-secure on (X , d) if its iterative process has a chaotic
behavior according to Devaney.
It can be established that,
Proposition 5 CIIS and CIDS are chaos-secure.
Proof: It has been proven in [4] that chaotic iterations
have a chaotic behavior, as defined by Devaney.
In the two following sections, we will study the qualitative
and quantitative properties of chaos-security for chaotic iter-
ations. These properties can measure the disorder generated
by our scheme, giving by doing so some important informa-
tions about the unpredictability level of such a process.
B. Quantitative property of chaotic iterations
Definition 5 (Expansivity) A function f is said to be ex-
pansive if ∃ε > 0, ∀x 6= y, ∃n ∈ N, d(fn(x), fn(y)) > ε.
Proposition 6 Gf0 is an expansive chaotic dynamical sys-
tem on X with a constant of expansivity is equal to 1.
Proof: If (S,E) 6= (Sˇ; Eˇ), then either E 6= Eˇ, so
at least one cell is not in the same state in E and Eˇ.
Consequently the distance between (S,E) and (Sˇ; Eˇ) is
greater or equal to 1. Or E = Eˇ. So the strategies S and Sˇ
are not equal. Let n0 be the first index in which the terms S
and Sˇ differ. Then ∀k < n0, G˜kf0(S,E) = G˜
k
f0
(Sˇ, Eˇ), and
G˜n0f0 (S,E) 6= G˜
n0
f0
(Sˇ, Eˇ). As E = Eˇ, the cell which has
changed in E at the n0-th iterate is not the same as the cell
which has changed in Eˇ, so the distance between G˜n0f0 (S,E)
and G˜n0f0 (Sˇ, Eˇ) is greater or equal to 2.
C. Qualitative property of chaotic iterations
Definition 6 (Topological mixing) A discrete dynamical
system is said to be topologically mixing if and only if,
for any couple of disjoint open set U, V 6= ∅, n0 ∈ N can
be found so that ∀n > n0, fn(U) ∩ V 6= ∅.
Proposition 7 G˜f0 is topologically mixing on (X ′, d′).
This result is an immediate consequence of the lemma
below.
Lemma 1 For any open ball B of X ′, an index n can be
found such that G˜nf0 (B) = X ′.
Proof: Let B = B((E, S), ε) be an open ball, which
the radius can be considered as strictly less than 1. All the
elements of B have the same state E and are such that an
integer k (= − log10(ε)) satisfies:
• all the strategies of B have the same k first terms,
• after the index k, all values are possible.
Then, after k iterations, the new state of the system is
G˜kf0(E, S)1 and all the strategies are possible (all the points
(G˜kf0(E, S)1,
ˆS), with any ˆS ∈ S, are reachable from B).
We will prove that all points of X ′ are reachable from B.
Let (E′, S′) ∈ X ′ and si be the list of the different cells
between G˜kf0(E, S)1 and E
′
. We denote by |s| the size of
the sequence si. So the point (Eˇ, Sˇ) of B defined by:
• Eˇ = E,
• Sˇi = Si, ∀i 6 k,
• Sˇk+i = si, ∀i 6 |s|,
• ∀i ∈ N, Sk+|s|+i = S′i.
is such that G˜k+|s|f0 (Eˇ, Sˇ) = (E
′, S′). This concludes the
proofs of the lemma and of the proposition.
V. COMPARISON BETWEEN SPREAD-SPECTRUM AND
CHAOTIC ITERATIONS
The consequences of topological mixing for data hiding
are multiple. Firstly, security can be largely improved by
considering the number of iterations as a secret key. An
attacker will reach all of the possible media when iterating
without this key. Additionally, he cannot benefit from a KOA
setup, by studying media in the neighborhood of the original
cover. Moreover, as in a topological mixing situation, it is
possible that any hidden message (the initial condition), is
sent to the same fixed watermarked content (with different
numbers of iterations), the interest to be in a KMA setup
is drastically reduced. Lastly, as all of the watermarked
contents are possible for a given hidden message, depending
on the number of iterations, CMA attacks will fail.
The property of expansivity reinforces drastically the
sensitivity in the aims of reducing the benefits that Eve can
obtain from an attack in KMA or KOA setup. For example,
it is impossible to have an estimation of the watermark by
moving the message (or the cover) as a cursor in situation of
expansivity: this cursor will be too much sensitive and the
changes will be too important to be useful. On the contrary,
a very large constant of expansivity ε is unsuitable: the cover
media will be strongly altered whereas the watermark would
be undetectable. Finally, spread-spectrum is relevant when
a discrete and secure data hiding technique is required in
WOA setup. However, this technique should not be used in
KOA and KMA setup, due to its lack of expansivity.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, the links between stego-security and chaos-
security has been deepened. The information hiding scheme
presented in [2], which is based on chaotic iterations, has
been recalled and its level of security has been studied.
It has been proven that this algorithm is twice stego and
chaos-secure. This was already the case for spread-spectrum
techniques, as it has been established in [3]. Moreover, as
for spread-spectrum, chaotic iterations possess the qualita-
tive property of topological mixing, which are useful to
withstand attacks. However, unlike spread-spectrum, chaotic
iterations are expansive, so this scheme is better than spread-
spectrum in KOA and KMA setups. Incidentally, this result
shows that the new framework for security tends to improve
the ability to compare data hiding scheme. In future work,
we will give a better understanding of the links between
these two security frameworks. Additionally, the comparison
between spread-spectrum and chaotic iterations outlined in
this paper will be extended. The security of other existing
schemes will be studied in the framework of chaos-security.
Last, but not least, the way to understand these new tools
in terms of data hiding aims will be enhanced: this study is
required to make chaos-security framework truly useful in
practice.
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